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Library > Speeches > AFA, ROA & NDIA Capitol Hill Breakfast Forum "Cyber Security, Space, and U.S. Security"

AFA, ROA & NDIA Capitol Hill Breakfast Forum "Cyber Security, Space, and U.S. Security"

General William L. Shelton, Commander, Air Force Space Command

Washington, D.C., July 16, 2013

General Shelton: Well thank you, and it's really a pleasure to be with you this morning. And I want to thank the Air Force Association, publicly, for all that they do. They say things we can't say. They advocate things in ways that we can't, and do just a lot of good for the United States Air Force and its Airmen. So thank you very much, Peter, and to the AFA.

I want to offer just a few prepared remarks this morning, but leave a lot of time for Q&A. So please, have your questions ready. I'd rather talk about what you want to talk about than anything I might have prepared.

I also want to tell you that I'm tired of talking about bad news all the time. It seems like all the news is bad. So I'm going to spend most of my time talking about things that are good within the Air Force and the space and the cyber business.

It seems like we're talking about budgets and sequestration and sexual assaults and all these other issues that are just really kind of bad news, and I'm tired of talking about that. But, you've got to give me one rant here first for a second. I'm also extremely tired of reading articles in various publications that there is no impact to sequestration. Let me assure you, there are plenty of impacts to sequestration.

And those who are writing those articles, those who are saying that there is no impact and the sky has not fallen and so on and so forth, I would like for them to come live with me for a couple of days and try to make ends meet on budgets that just don't close. To the end of the fiscal year here, I know I'm probably about $4 or $5 million short just getting to the end of the year. So how we're going to scrape up $4 or $5 million to make it to the end of the year, much less make it through another year of sequestration in '14 - yeah, no impact; no impact. Let me assure you, there is plenty of impact.

And, you know, when I've got civilians who are taking a 20 percent pay cut for the remainder of the year, and they lose not only the 20 percent - that's tragic enough - but we also lose the productivity of those civilians as well and their contribution to national defense for the remainder of the fiscal year, that is horrific. I stood in front of my civilians the other day and I apologized to them. I said, your government has let you down, and that's how I feel about it.

We have let them down. We have broken faith with our civilian workforce.

So anyway, enough of that. Enough of my rant.

So, what's going well in space and cyber? And a little peek into our future as well. And I think I said this repeatedly over the last couple of years, but it's worth repeating. Let me say it one more time. Space and cyber capabilities are absolutely foundational to how we do business in the United States military today.

You can talk about the entire spectrum of conflict. You can talk about operations from humanitarian relief all the way through major combat operations. You can talk about tactical operations all the way through the strategic. You can talk about the soldier in the fox hole all the way to the president of the United States. There's a dependency on space and cyber capability that we really can't think about removing. So with that in mind, what are we doing to ensure that we will continue to have that capability now and into the future?

Well let me start with cyber. I'll tell you, our 24th Air Force down at Lackland Air Force Base is doing an absolutely superb job of operating and defending Air Force networks to provide the warfighting capability we need. There are literally millions, millions of probes every day on defense networks. And what you don't hear - you hear about the penetrations that get through. What you don't hear about is about those millions that are repelled. Again, tremendous work by our folks doing that.

We're also collapsing down to a single Air Force network called the AFNET. That's our number one cyber priority, getting collapsed down to the single network. The reason we're doing that is there are now just 16 touch points to the external world, if you will, to the Internet, within the Air Force.

That's much easier to defend. It's much more consolidated, from a command and control perspective. It also allows us much more flexibility. Once we get this migration completed, I can go from base X to base Y, slip my CAC card into a computer on base Y, and it's just like I'm at home. So there's a lot of flexibility. There's much better defend-ability of our networks, and it's going to be great once we get it completed this next year.

And it's, by the way, just in time for inclusion into the Joint Information Environment. You've heard a lot about JIE, probably. The Air Force has been accused of being a little bit recalcitrant on JIE. That's not the case, but there is a fair amount of due diligence that we wanted to do both from a technical perspective and from a business case perspective.

We're working our way through this. You'll see some announcements in the not-too-distant future about progress we've made. But just trust me when I say that the Air Force is very committed to JIE. We want to make sure we do it the right way. We want to make sure that it's an architecture that we can live with.

We're also standing up additional cyber mission teams in support of U.S. Cyber Command. You've probably seen that reported as well. U.S. Cyber Command wants to stand up these national and combatant commands mission teams to support cyber operations, and particularly looking at offensive cyber operations. So we're in the middle of that process.

The Air Force demand for that is going to be somewhere around 1,500 or so people. We will stand up a project task force, a PROTAF, in a smart way, in a very disciplined, rigorous way. There are certainly Title 10, Title 50 U.S. Code kinds of issues here related to SIGINT authorities and those kinds of things, so we'll work our way very carefully through this to make sure that we've stood up the right kind of teams and that we're doing right by U.S. Cyber Command and by the Air Force.

You've also read about us establishing cyber weapons systems. Again, something I need to set the record straight on. They aren't really weapons systems. But, you know, if you're going to do a normal process within the Air Force you have to declare something a weapons system, and then it comes with all those standard processes and standard funding.

For too long, we've had kind of special funding relationships for our cyber capabilities, and frankly it has caused us to run short on money. It has resulted in end-of-year fixes to programs, as opposed to normal sustainment. So we've set aside these six programs. We call them weapons systems. They are not in any way weapons. But we call them that so that we can get them into the standard sustainment process; just part of the business of normalizing cyber in the United States Air Force and trying to get it on the same level as air and space in terms of the support for those capabilities.

Let me switch to space now, and I'm going to work from geosynchronous orbit down in terms of programs. That's kind of the way I think about it, so it helps me when we're talking about it to think about orbital regimes.

Starting with the Space-Based Infrared System, we've got two satellites on-orbit now. We had some hiccups, admittedly, with the first satellite. We've got the second one on-orbit and it seems to be doing a little bit better.

But a lot of infant issues on the first satellite. It has been up about two years and we're still wringing out the sensors. We're still trying to understand how this thing operates on-orbit. So, a lot of work still to do.

We are on contract for SBIRS through vehicle number six, and there are some really hard decisions we are going to have to make after vehicle six. Vehicle six will take us through the mid-2020 timeframe. As we look out into the future and we see threats from other nations coming to the fore, it's a very different space environment that we're operating in today. It will be very different five years from now than what it is today.

So are we going to continue on the path we're on with some of our high priority satellites? If you think about SBIRS in context, what is it designed for? It is designed to operate in some of the most difficult circumstances the United States might ever face. It is designed to provide warning of strategic attack on the United States.

That being the case, you want it to be survivable. And with the threats that are coming, we don't believe that SBIRS in its current incarnation will be survivable past the mid-2020s. So we believe this calls for a different kind of capability, perhaps a disaggregated capability where you take strategic missile warning and tactical missile warning and separate them onto different satellites. That's one path.

Perhaps you can host some of these infrared sensors on other platforms. That's another path. So we are in the process of studying these various paths, alternative architectures we might decide to pursue. And our - what are called space modernization initiative funds - are designed to do just that, to explore these alternative architectures and see what we think will work best in the new threat environment and also in the new budget environment we're in.

Wide-Band Global Satellite - Jeff Trauberman and I were just talking about this. We're just about to launch the sixth satellite. So we've got five of these on-orbit. We've got contracts out through vehicle number 10, international involvement in this program as well.

People have bought into the capability of a broader WGS architecture. And all these satellites are working extremely well. And it's lots of bandwidth, lots of bandwidth.

A single WGS satellite is more bandwidth than the entire constellation of the Defense Satellite Communications System, DSCS, its predecessor. A single satellite beats the higher constellation of DSCS before it. But it's still not enough.

I mean, there has just been insatiable demand for satellite bandwidth. So the question for us in the future is how do we satisfy all that bandwidth demand? Do we do that through a continuation of dedicated military satellites? Is it a service that we contract for? Is it a lease-to-buy kind of thing? Again, lots of alternative architectures that we need to look at here.

But what we don't think is a smart way to go is how we're doing business right now, which is buy bandwidth on the spot market, so to speak. Eighty percent of our traffic, satellite communications traffic, coming back from Southwest Asia comes over commercial assets right now. And we are buying that in piece parts, which is absolutely the most expensive way to do it. So, lots of work to do.

Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellites, AEHF, this is the satellite that provides the president the capability to communicate with deployed forces when there's a nuclear environment, either nuclear attack in progress or post-nuclear attack when the atmosphere is simulated from the nuclear effects. It is the satellite, again, that just has to be there. It is designed specifically so that the president can have that kind of communications capability. So again, in this new threat environment, does it make sense to keep going down the path that we're on for Advanced-EHF?

Like SBIRS, we're through satellite number six in terms of contracted actions, again through the mid-2020s or so, but we've got to find alternatives that are much more resilient to certainly the environment and are much more affordable. A single Advanced-EHF satellite is a over a billion dollar satellite. So, you know, in this budget climate is that really where we want to be? I would say it's not.

So what's our future in light of the threats and in light of the budget environment? We'll spend those Space Modernization Initiative funds smartly to get to that answer.

GPS--31 satellites on orbit right now, performing extremely well. This constellation just keeps on ticking. We have a little trouble with the new ground system that we were developing. We're trying to get that back on track, due to a phasing problem between - let me back up just a second.

You know, in terms of the terminals and ground systems for satellites, we contract for those separately. There was a time when we put those together into a single program. The decision was made that that's just too large a management effort, so we separate them into different contracts.

But the problem that has caused is they can get out of phase. So you end up with capability on-orbit and the terminals on the ground not being ready. That's where we're going to be with GPS-3. Our first couple of GPS-3 launches will probably go before the ground system designed for GPS-3 is actually ready. But we'll have capability in place, kind of a bridge capability, to get us to the place where we can fly GPS-3 while we wait for the full ground system to come on.

We're on contract with GPS-3 through satellite number eight. Nine and out is now a question mark for, again, these alternative architecture ideas. Could we design, for example, a navigation-only small satellite that provides nav capability, but the nuclear detonation detection system, that also flies on the GPS-3, maybe is sparsely populated in the constellation so not every GPS satellite has to have an NDS payload? That's an alternative.

Could we do NDS as a free flyer? That's another alternative. A lot of these things are being studied, we'll see how we do with GPS-3, nine and out, but that has to be decided probably within the next year or so.

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. The on-orbit constellation is doing well. We've got two satellites left in the barn. Luckily these DMSPs have been living a little bit longer, so we've had these ready to go for a while. We were able to do a service life extension program, so to speak, on those satellites.

And so 19 and 20 are ready to go. We'll probably launch 19 next year and then we'll put 20 on-orbit when we need to. We're trying to meter this out as long as we can with DMSP and wait for the follow-on program.

It's looking like the follow-on program is going to be a much smaller satellite, much simpler. We'll take advantage of international advancements in meteorological programs. We'll take advantage of NOAA's work in meteorological programs, and just get to those unique requirements we need for this particular satellite. We're in the midst of an analysis of alternatives right now to get to the right design, the right requirements, and come up with a DMSP that's much more affordable.

Space-Based Surveillance System - a satellite that literally is helping us keep track of all the traffic in geosynchronous orbit. It looks up and just vacuums, just Hoovers up all the observations - it's just light. It's looking for reflections off the satellites. It's doing great and we're looking at end of life probably in 2017.

And we've got no follow-on in the program right now, even though we know this is a critical capability. The affordability issues have driven us to not having a follow-on program wedged in just yet. But we're working hard to wedge that in the '15 budget. We'll see where that comes out, but it's a capability for space situational awareness that just has to be there. And we're working this hard and working all the options.

Space launch. We are now - and people hate it when I mention the number - but we are now at 60 in a row in national security launches. 60 in a row-- unprecedented in the history of spaceflight. A wonderful, wonderful success record.

The issue is it just costs too doggone much. Now, when you're putting a billion and a half to $2 billion satellite on-orbit, you certainly don't want to cut any corners. But we have got to get to the place where we can drive down the cost of space launch.

Some of these ideas about smaller satellites will help us because we'll go to smaller launch vehicles, potentially. We are doing Block buys of boosters for the future. We're buying 36 boosters. We'll probably finalize that contract here over the summer or into the fall.

Fourteen of those launch requirements that we know are out there have been set aside for New Entrants into the business so we can help to support them coming up as launch providers. So we'll get New Entrants certified in the national security launch business and we'll get to the place where we'll have some competition.

United Launch Alliance has been a terrific partner. Operationally, I've got nothing but praise for them. I just wish their prices were a little bit lower, so we're going to work that part of the equation.

Space Situation Awareness literally underpins everything we do. Every aspect of space, from launch through satellite operations, through you name it, everything in space depends on Space Situational Awareness. We worry about debris on-orbit now. It's a growing problem. We worry about traffic management. We end up being kind of the FAA for space, not because we desire that role, necessarily, but we're the only ones that can do it. So we're providing that traffic management to all operators in space.

We also do threat assessment. We do that as part of SSA. And we're working to get even better. At the Joint Space Operations Center out at Vandenberg Air Force Base we're developing a new mission system out there, a new system that will allow us to do our job of space situational awareness much better. We already have initial capability there, adding much more capability in the next couple of years. And you'll see us replacing, literally, 1994-vintage software with a modern open architecture that's ready to do much more than we can do today.

We are also concerned about the Space Fence. We're ready to award a contract for the Space Fence. You've seen in the press the Strategic Choices Management Review that the Pentagon is doing.

That award is being held up while we're determining whether or not this is a priority for the department. I'll tell you, from a personal perspective, it's a high priority for Air Force Space Command, and I think the nation, in terms of Space Situational Awareness. So we're hopeful that we'll get authority to award that contract very shortly.

The bottom line on the future of space, we are working very hard to find the nexus of required capability, affordability and resiliency. If you think about that in a Venn diagram sense, there is a sweet spot right in the middle there somewhere, which is what we're looking for. Nobody is relieving us of requirements. If anything, the requirements for space capability go up. But that required capability, that's affordable and is resilient, all together, that's exactly what we're trying to achieve.

It may be very different architectures. As I said, we're locked in where we are until the mid-2020s. But because of development timelines, because of the budgetary timelines, we've got to make decisions probably in the next year or so on our future to get to where we want to be in the mid-2020s.

I think the future is very bright in space and cyber. I told you I'd talk about good things. Yes, there are challenges. There are challenges in budgets. There are challenges in threats. But in every strategic review I've seen, space and cyber are mentioned prominently as things that we have to fund and things we have to protect. Budget pressures are going to make it tough on us to get better, but we've got to find a way to get better in both space and cyber using affordable means to get there.

I'll tell you there are a lot of great people within Air Force Space Command doing just wonderful work in both space and cyber, wonderful work for the nation, for the Department of Defense and for the Air Force. So for me personally, it's kind of great to be the old guy that gets to stand around and watch these young folks make the magic happen. I'll tell you, it's just a privilege to be in this job.

I think we've got a bright future ahead, as I said. I think there are going to be some things that all of you can help us with, as we think through these problems. And I appreciate everybody's ideas.

I know there are a lot of people that understand these issues, that have ideas that they can contribute. They have technical know-how. They have political know-how. And we appreciate all your ideas and we'll certainly invite any advice you could give us as we try to navigate some pretty tough waters here.

Thanks. Let me stop there and see what questions you might have so we can talk about what you want to talk about.

MS. Good morning. Thank you for the speech. It's really helpful. But a couple of things I'd be curious to hear your take on in terms of saving money: both international cooperation and also by not launching so many satellites on-orbit servicing, (?) - (off mic).

General Shelton: International cooperation -- certainly something we are pursuing. There are things we need to think through as we look at international cooperation, certainly with our closest allies there are no concerns. As we reach outside however, you have to think about-there are some precedents here we have to think our way through.

There are times when unilateral action by the United States may be required. You can have cooperative relationships that could hinder our ability to act unilaterally if we needed to. I can think of cases where we needed to conduct air operations and were not allowed to use certain bases to conduct those operations. And it caused incredible pain in terms of being able to support, to take off from much more distant bases, and then all the logistical issues that arise from that, the tanker support, and so on and so forth. So you take that up to space, we don't want to be in that same place, from my perspective, where we're critically dependent on some international relationship to get the job done should it come to that.

In terms of cooperation that might create additional capabilities, such as international investment in Advanced-EHF, international investment in WGS, we're very supportive of that. And that has been a wonderful partnership, but again, that is a U.S. owned and operated system that has international participation, as opposed to, again, a critical dependency.

The second part of your question?

MS. : On-orbit servicing.

General Shelton: Yes, on-orbit servicing. You know, this is a very difficult one for me and I'll just - I'm a victim of my own experience. When I look at satellites and the development timelines, and let's talk about basically a seven year development cycle, and then the engineering that goes into that for space qualified hardware, by the time you launch it, probably 12 or so years old in terms of technology, if it's on-orbit for 10 years, now you're looking at a technology that's 20 years old, at least.

And what most of the servicing people are talking about is just putting more gas onboard. Well, just think about Moore's Law in terms of computing power. I am way behind the power curve now in terms of computing power. So is that something I really want to do, just extend the life of the satellite by putting more gas onboard?

I also know solar arrays degrade over time, so my ability to produce solar power has degraded with the life of that satellite on-orbit. So from a business case perspective, I can't make it work in my head. Now I would love to have my thinking improved on this. And by the way, the on-orbit servicer is going to be an expensive proposition on its own: cooperative rendezvous, prox ops, docking, and then servicing. In our case right now, we don't have anything that's designed to handle that servicing. So you're talking about a whole family now of systems that have to come together and be designed for that servicing. Maybe there's a day where this all works, and probably it's long after I'm on the porch in the rocker. But for right now, I just can't make it work.

MR. : You mentioned the international cooperation aspect and some of the sensitivities to that. In terms of the weather satellite follow-on, part of the analysis of alternatives is to rely on NOAA and more international folks. We think of Europe. NOAA has done its own international reviews, if something happens to just one JPSS satellite before the next one could be launched, there backup plan would have to rely on China for especially imagery for our weather information. How does that play into your analysis of alternatives, if we were to have to rely on China for sensitive weather information?

General Shelton: I don't know that there's a real sensitivity issue on weather information. You know, that's just one of those things that's shared routinely. And the kinds of things that we would need uniquely for warfighting operations, that's the kind of thing that we're talking about providing inherent to DOD. So the standard international weather forecasting capability, I don't think that's ever going to be a problem.

MS. : Could you talk a little bit about what, to your knowledge, led to the failure of the last missile intercept test earlier this month? Some reports have said there was an issue with the stage separation possible coming from one of the batteries. And also, to your knowledge, would that test, had it gone forward, involved any decoys distinguishing issues, and will the test planned for later this year, also on the GMD also involve decoys?

General Shelton: Yeah, if you couldn't hear the question in the back, it was about the missile defense test two or three weeks ago. I really don't have any information on that. I'm sorry, but I have to refer you to the Missile Defense Agency because I honestly don't have any insight at all other than what I've read in the press.

MR. Pat Host: Hi, General, I'm Pat Host with Defense Daily. You said earlier this year that you were going to hire about 1,000 cyber people to boost up on cyber. Today you said it would be 1,500. And also last week the chief scientist said that her office has been disproportionately affected by sequestration because of largely civilians. Is that going to be the same thing with your cyber efforts?

General Shelton: Again, the question was about the numbers of new cyber operators we are going to hire. I'm being a little fuzzy on the numbers because the numbers are really being finalized. But when I said about 1,000 we thought the number was about 1,200. When I say 1,500, we're not sure exactly where it's going to settle, but it has gone up from where we initially thought it was going to be. In terms of being able to hire those people, no we're going to carve those people out somewhere from within the Air Force structure, and we'll fund those civilian billets because this is high priority within the department.

MR. : Sir, when it comes to the integration of different capabilities, I know JMS has this as part of its goal, but is the Air Force making any progress at the current time with different SSA data and the integration of the management systems in certain mission areas that are - (off mic).

General Shelton: That's been the one that I've been fussing about for years, is the integration of all this data. We're not data poor. We're data rich, actually.

And it's our ability to fuse and integrate all this data that would really make the operators in the JSpOC happy with their ability to keep track of the entire picture of what's going on in space. That's exactly what JMS is going to do for us. Right now we've got, again, this Gordian knot of software from 1994 that you just can't break apart. We've got some band-aid systems where we can kind of hand-jam things in. But we can't routinely flow data from disparate sensors, from almost - I'll use MDA sensors as an example.

At the Missile Defense Agency we've got radars all over the place doing missile defense jobs. When they're not doing missile defense, why aren't they doing space surveillance and feeding that data to the JSpOC? So we've got capability here, we just don't have the system that can ingest the data. We will have that system.

MR. Aaron Mehta: You mentioned that Space Fence is being held up. Are there any other programs in your jurisdiction being held up?

General Shelton: No, none -- none under space or cyber. I know there are others within the department, and that was a decision made as part of the Strategic Choices Management Review. Since you're looking for what are the high priority items within the Department of Defense, put those on hold for now rather than award those contracts and get committed and then maybe have to pay termination liabilities as part of that. It's just a smart management decision, but we need to get moving on the Space Fence pretty quick.

MR. : (Off mic).

General Shelton: I'm sorry, I can't hear the last part.

MR. : In regards to Space Fence and other strategic programs, what has to happen before you can award the contract?

General Shelton: Yes, the only thing we're waiting on is the clearance from Mr. Kendall to go ahead and award the contract. So this is going to be a, you know, probably Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Defense level kind of decision--let's move out. And then Mr. Kendall will give the official go-ahead to award or not. That could be one of the outcomes.

MS. : If the decision is made to not go ahead with the award, what other option is the Service looking at to buy or consider?

General Shelton: There are people that are looking at service life extension programs, upgrade programs, for sensors that are out there, such as Eglin, for example. We've got a big Space Surveillance sensor at Eglin, and are looking at could you make improvements down in Eglin to compensate for the loss of the fence? The answer to the question before the study, I know.

But there's not anything that we've got that we could upgrade to replicate the capability that the fence would provide. We've specifically chosen Kwajalein to be able to cover low-inclination orbits, as well as high inclination orbits, so it will give us darn near full inclination coverage of all orbits. And there's just nothing else we've got that will do that for us.

MR. Peter Huessy: General, let me ask you a question. We have three audiences here in Washington. We have public, we have media, and Congress. Often your success of doing something is a narrative that is understood. Where do you see the narrative on space needing to be, let me say improved; or, where should it go given the challenges you're facing with respect to Space Command?

General Shelton: I don't know if you could hear that in the back, but he asked where does the narrative here in Washington need to be improved to further space efforts? I think we've actually got a pretty good narrative. We've got a set of staffers in place now in the key committees that really understand.

It's not - we don't always agree. We can agree to disagree. But there are good conversations and there are people that are really committed to doing the right thing. So it is really kind of a pleasant experience to be able to do business with them on the Hill.

I think the industry team understands where we're going right now. I think that the public, writ large, mostly doesn't even understand what DOD space is about. You know, space to them is NASA. And, that's okay.

I mean, we don't need to survive on the public relations part of this the way NASA does, so it's kind of a different animal. So I think we're in fairly good shape from a public dialogue point of view. That doesn't mean that we're going to get all that we'd like to have, but it is certainly not a hole we're trying to climb out of either.

MR. : Maybe nine months ago - off mic - cyber space - off mic - where would you say you are now - off mic

General Shelton: We're still going through the dialogue on that. The senior leadership of the Air Force is being very deliberate as we work our way through this. There's no question that we're going to support what U.S. CyberCom is looking for in terms of these national mission teams and combatant command mission teams.

But in terms of what the Air Force does and how we manage career fields and how we organize ourselves, we're not quite there yet. And I think we've probably got another couple of months of work to do here to get through some of the really thorny issues: again, Title 10, Title 50 related things. We're in kind of two different organizations right now. There's a Title 10 organization. There's a Title 50 organization.

But they both have to combine to provide these cyber teams that U.S. Cyber Command is looking for. So, more work to do. I think that we've moved the ball down the field in terms of the dialogue, but we're not to the decision point yet.

MR. : Sir, you mentioned the long time lag between idea and on-orbit. And then you gave the example of on-orbit repair. Is there any way to shorten that? I was at a meeting with the CIO a few months ago and the new SES comes in to chair a meeting and gives us a debriefing. And the first person says, this capability will be IOC in 2019 and then it will be 2013. And then in two or three more briefings the woman in charge of the meeting looks around the room and says, is it just me or does this seem like pretty long timeframes? There was just silence. Is there anything that can be done to attack that, anything that you're doing?

General Shelton: Yes, part of it is just the acquisition process, the budgeting and acquisition process. But there's also - we can shorten development timelines, no doubt about it. And I think if we can get to the place where we're lowering the complexity on our satellites - this whole concept that disaggregating our satellites into simpler packages maybe even on commercial buses - you get to the place where if you're not developing a one of a kind in every case, you've got a payload that you stick on some standard hardware with standard interfaces. And we're hoping that will allow us to shorten these development timelines considerably.

But it just takes time and a lot of it is bureaucracy. Sorry, but that's the truth. The commercial model is sign a contract and out the door in about three years. I wish we could do that. We're trying to get much more commercial in our practices.

MR. Peter Huessy: Thank you, General.



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